In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment, Mary is confined to a black-and-white room and educated through black-and-white books and lectures on a black-and-white television. In this way, she learns everything there is to know about the physical world. If physicalism -- the doctrine that everything is physical -- is true, then Mary seems to know all there is to know. What happens, then, when she emerges from her black-and-white room and sees the color red for the first time?
Jackson's knowledge argument says that Mary comes to know a new fact about color, and that, therefore, physicalism is false. The knowledge argument remains one of the most controversial and important arguments in contemporary philosophy. There's Something About Mary -- the first book devoted solely to the argument -- collects the main essays in which Jackson presents and later rejects his argument along with key responses by other philosophers.
These responses are organized around a series of questions: Does Mary learn anything new? Does she gain only know-how the ability hypothesis , or merely get acquainted with something she knew previously the acquaintance hypothesis? Does she learn a genuinely new fact or an old fact in disguise?
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And finally, does she really know all the physical facts before her release, or is this a "misdescription"? The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness. Daniel Stoljar Online Papers I have written or co-edited the following books: Interviews, blog posts, videos etc Sitemap.
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Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness Jacket Description Perhaps more than any other philosopher of mind, Ned Block synthesizes philosophical and scientific approaches to the mind; he is unique in moving back and forth across this divide, doing so with creativity and intensity. In this book, Daniel Stoljar presents a lucid, persuasive rejection of this widespread view, defending a reasonable optimism about philosophical progress. He argues that when you think through exactly what philosophical problems are, and what it takes to solve them, it becomes clear that we have correctly answered big philosophical questions in the past and therefore should expect to do so in the future.
Philosophy of mind series. ISBN Limit Search: Full text only. Video only. This Issue This Publication Anywhere. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between con… Read more The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness.
How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and introspective self-knowledge? Should we explain consciousness in terms of introspective self-knowledge or vice versa? Until recently, questions in epistemology and the philosophy of mind were pursued largely in isolation from one another. This volume aims to integrate these two lines of research by bringing together fourteen new essays and one reprinted essay on the relationship between introspection, self-knowledge, and consciousness.
Is there a Lockean argument against expressivism? It is sometimes suggested that expressivism in meta-ethics is to be criticized on grounds which do not themselves concern meta-ethics in particular, but which rather concern philosophy of language more generally. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit ; see also Jackson and Pettit , and Jackson have recently advanced a novel version of such an argument.
They begin by noting that expressivism in its central form makes two claims—that ethical sentences are not truth evaluable, and that to … Read more It is sometimes suggested that expressivism in meta-ethics is to be criticized on grounds which do not themselves concern meta-ethics in particular, but which rather concern philosophy of language more generally. They then argue that, given some plausible premises in the philosophy of language emanating mainly from Locke, the two central claims of expressivism are contradictory: when combined with the plausible premises, they say, the second claim refutes the first.
Moral Expressivism. Does Nagel's footnote eleven solve the mind-body problem? Russellian Monism Panpsychism. This article explores two consequences of intentionalism. My first line of argument focuses on the impact of intentionalism on the 'hard problem' of phenomenal character. If intentionalism is true, the phenomenal supervenes on the intentional. Furthermore, if physicalism about the intentional is also true, the intentional supervenes on the physical. Therefore, if intentionalism and physicalism are both true, then, by transitivity of supervenience, physicalism about the phenomenal is true.
I argu… Read more This article explores two consequences of intentionalism. I argue that this transitivity argument is not persuasive, because on any interpretation of its central terms, at least one of its premises is as controversial as its conclusion already is. My second line of argument is about the consequences of intentionalism for the error theory of color perception.
I suggest that if intentionalism is true, projectivism must be true also, because under this condition there is no single concept of color that can be used for the qualification of objects as well as for the characterization of experiences.
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Representationalism Aspects of Consciousness. Strawson's realistic monism Journal of Consciousness Studies. Russellian Monism. Physicalism Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical.
The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental.
The general idea is that the nature of the actual world i. Of course, physicalists don't deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don't seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are either physical or supervene on the physical.
The conclusion of this argument entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. If it is possible that I have a zombie duplicate however, then it is possible that the physical truths are as they are and some psychological truth is different. Hence 3 entails that physicalism is false.
Zombies (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Spring Edition)
The second conceivability argument is one that is almost as famous, though perhaps it is l… Read more The conclusion of this argument entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. The second conceivability argument is one that is almost as famous, though perhaps it is less famous for being a conceivability argument: the perfect actor argument against behaviorism. In a version that is both familiar and relatively clear, it goes like this.
pierreducalvet.ca/43303.php The standard picture -- Form and alternatives -- The starting point view -- The theory view -- Hempel's dilemma -- The necessity view -- Is necessitation necessary? Formulating Physicalism.